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Abstract
Is there a classifier that ensures optimal robust-
ness against all adversarial attacks? This paper
tackles the question by adopting a game-theoretic
point of view. We present the adversarial attacks
and defenses problem as an infinite zero-sum
game where classical results (e.g. Nash or Sion
theorems) do not apply. We demonstrate the non-
existence of a Nash equilibrium in our game when
the classifier and the Adversary are both determin-
istic, hence giving a negative answer to the above
question in the deterministic regime. Nonethe-
less, the question remains open in the randomized
regime. We tackle this problem by showing that,
under mild conditions on the dataset distribution,
any deterministic classifier can be outperformed
by a randomized one. This gives arguments for
using randomization, and leads us to a simple
method for building randomized classifiers that
are robust to state-or-the-art adversarial attacks.
Empirical results validate our theoretical analysis,
and show that our defense method considerably
outperforms Adversarial Training against strong
adaptive attacks, by achieving 0.55 accuracy un-
der adaptive PGD-attack on CIFAR10, compared
to 0.42 for Adversarial training.
1. Introduction
Adversarial example attacks recently became a major con-
cern in the machine learning community. An adversarial
attack refers to a small, imperceptible change of an input
that is maliciously designed to fool a machine learning al-
gorithm. Since the seminal work of (Biggio et al., 2013)
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and (Szegedy et al., 2014) it became increasingly important
to understand the very nature of this phenomenon (Fawzi
et al., 2016; 2018; Bubeck et al., 2019; Ilyas et al., 2019;
Gourdeau et al., 2019). Furthermore, a large body of work
has been published on designing attacks (Goodfellow et al.,
2015; Papernot et al., 2016a; Madry et al., 2018; Carlini &
Wagner, 2017; Athalye et al., 2018) and defenses (Goodfel-
low et al., 2015; Papernot et al., 2016b; Madry et al., 2018;
Cohen et al., 2019).
Besides, in real-life scenarios such as for an autonomous
car, errors can be very costly. It is not enough to just defend
against new attacks as they are published. We would need an
algorithm that behaves optimally against every single attack.
However, it remains unknown whether such a defense exists.
This leads to the following questions, for which we provide
principled and theoretically-grounded answers.
Q1: Is there a deterministic classifier that ensures optimal
robustness against any adversarial attack?
A1: To answer this question, in Section 3.1, we cast the
adversarial examples problem as a infinite zero-sum game
between a Defender (the classifier) and an Adversary that
produces adversarial examples. Then we demonstrate, in
Section 4, the non-existence of a Nash equilibrium in the
deterministic setting of this game. This entails that no deter-
ministic classifier can claim to be more robust than all other
classifiers against any possible adversarial attack. Another
consequence of our analysis is that there is no free lunch for
transferable attacks: an attack that works on all classifiers
will never be optimal against any of them.
Q2: Would randomized defense strategies be a suitable
alternative to defend against strong adversarial attacks?
A2: We tackle this problem both theoretically and empir-
ically. In Section 5, we demonstrate, under a mild con-
dition on the data distribution, that for any deterministic
defense there exists a mixture of classifiers that offers bet-
ter worst-case theoretical guarantees. Building upon this,
we devise a method that generates a robust randomized
classifier with a 1 step boosting method. We evaluate this
method, in Section 6 against strong adaptive attacks on the
CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 datasets. It outperforms Adversar-
ial Training against both `∞-PGD (Madry et al., 2018), and
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`2-C&W (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) attacks. More precisely,
on CIFAR10, our algorithm achieves 0.54 (resp. 0.65) ac-
curacy under attack against these attacks, which is an im-
provement of 0.11 (resp. 0.14) over Adversarial Training.
2. Related Work
Many works have studied adversarial examples, in several
different settings. We discuss hereafter the different frame-
works that we believe to be related to our work, and discuss
the aspects on which our contribution differs from them.
Distributionally robust optimization. The work in (Sinha
et al., 2018) addresses the problem of adversarial exam-
ples through the lens of distributionally robust optimization.
They study a min-max problem where the Adversary ma-
nipulates the test distribution while being constrained in a
Wasserstein distance ball (they impose a global constraint
on distributions for the Adversary, while we study a local,
pointwise constraint, leading to different attack policies). A
similar analysis was presented in (Lee & Raginsky, 2018) in
a more general setting that does not focus on adversarial ex-
amples. Even though our work studies a close problem, our
reasoning is very different. We adopt a game theoretic stand-
point, which allows us to investigate randomized defenses
and endow them with strong theoretical evidences.
Game Theory. Some works have tackled the problem of
adversarial examples as a two player game. For exam-
ple (Brückner & Scheffer, 2011) views adversarial example
attacks and defenses as a Stackelberg game. More recently,
(Rota Bulò et al., 2017) and (Perdomo & Singer, 2019)
investigated zero-sum games. They consider restricted ver-
sions of the game where classical theorems apply, such as
when the players only have a finite set of possible strate-
gies. We study a more general setting. Finally, (Dhillon
et al., 2018) motivates the use of noise injection as a defense
mechanism by game theoretic arguments but only present
empirical results.
Randomization. Following the work of (Dhillon et al.,
2018) and (Xie et al., 2018), several recent works stud-
ied noise injection as a defense mechanism. In particular,
(Lecuyer et al., 2018), followed by (Cohen et al., 2019; Li
et al., 2019; Pinot et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019) demon-
strated that noise injection can, in some cases, give provable
defense against adversarial attacks. The analysis and de-
fense method we propose in this paper are not based on
noise injection. However, a link could be made between
these works and the mixture we propose, by noting that a
classifier in which noise is being injected can be seen as an
infinite mixture of perturbed classifiers.
Optimal transport. Our work considers a distributionnal
setting, in which the Adversary manipulating the dataset is
formalized by a push-forward measure. This kind of setting
is close to optimal transport settings recently developed by
(Bhagoji et al., 2019) and (Pydi & Jog, 2019). Specifically,
these works investigate classifier-agnostic lower bounds on
the risk for binary classification under attack, with some
hypothesis on the data distribution. The main differences
are that we focus on studying equilibria and not deriving
bounds. Moreover, these works do not study the influence
of randomization. Finally they express the optimal risk of
the Defender in terms of transportation costs between two
distributions, whereas we explicitly study the Adversary’s
behaviour as a transport from one distribution to another.
Even though they do not treat the problem from the same
prism, we believe that these works are profoundly related
and complementary to ours.
Ensemble of classifiers. Some works have been done to
improve the robustness of a model by constructing ensem-
ble of classifiers (Abbasi & Gagné, 2017; Xu et al., 2017;
Verma & Swami, 2019; Pang et al., 2019; Sen et al., 2020).
However all the defense methods proposed in those papers
subsequently proved to be ineffective against adaptive at-
tacks introduced in (He et al., 2017; Tramer et al., 2020).
The main difference with our method is that it is not an
ensemble method since it uses sampling instead of voting to
aggregate the classifiers’ output. Hence in terms of volatil-
ity, in voting methods, whenever a majority agrees on an
opinion, all others votes will be ignored, whereas here each
classifier always contributes according to its probability
weights, which do not depend on the others.
3. A Game Theoretic point of view.
3.1. Initial problem statement
Notations. For any set Z with σ-algebra σ (Z), if there is
no ambiguity on the considered σ-algebra, we denote P (Z)
the set of all probability measures over (Z, σ (Z)), and
FZ the set of all measurable functions from (Z, σ (Z)) to
(Z, σ (Z)). For µ ∈ P (Z) and φ ∈ FZ , the pushforward
measure of µ by φ is the measure φ#µ such that φ#µ(B) =
µ(φ-1(B)) for any B ∈ σ(Z).
Binary classification task. Let X ⊂ Rd and Y = {-1, 1}.
We consider a distribution D ∈ P (X × Y) that we assume
to be of support X × Y . The Defender is looking for a hy-
pothesis (classifier) h in a class of functionsH, minimizing
the risk of h w.r.t. D:
R(h) : = E
(X,Y )∼D
[1 {h(X) 6= Y }]
= E
Y∼ν
[
E
X∼µY
[1 {h(X) 6= Y }]
]
.
(1)
WhereH := {h : x 7→ sgn g(x) | g : X → R continuous},
ν ∈ P (Y) is the probability measure that defines the law of
the random variable Y , and for any y ∈ Y , µy ∈ P (X ) is
the conditional law of X|(Y = y).
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Adversarial example attack (point-wise). Given a clas-
sifier h : X → Y and a data sample (x, y) ∼ D, the
Adversary seeks a perturbation τ ∈ X that is visually im-
perceptible, but modifies x enough to change its class, i.e.
h(x+ τ) 6= y. Such a perturbation is called an adversarial
example attack. In practice, it is hard to evaluate the set of
visually imperceptible modifications of an image. However,
a sufficient condition to ensure that the attack is undetectable
is to constrain the perturbation τ to have a small norm, be
it for the `∞ or the `2 norm. Hence, one should always
ensure that ‖τ‖∞ ≤ ∞, or ‖τ‖2 ≤ 2, depending on the
norm used to measure visual imperceptibility. The choice
of the threshold depends on the application at hand. For
example, on CIFAR datasets, typical values for ∞ and 2
are respectively, 0.031 and 0.4/0.6/0.8. In the remaining
of this work, we will define our constraint using an `2 norm,
but all our results remains valid for an `∞ based constraint.
Adversarial example attack (distributional). The Adver-
sary chooses, for every x ∈ X , a perturbation that depends
on its true label y. This amounts to construct, for each label
y ∈ Y , a measurable function φy such that φy(x) is the per-
turbation associated with the labeled example (x, y). This
function naturally induces a probability distribution over
adversarial examples, which is simply the push-forward
measure φy#µy. The goal of the Adversary is thus to find
φ = (φ-1, φ1) ∈ (FX|2)2 that maximizes the adversarial
riskRadv(h,φ) defined as follows:
Radv(h,φ) := E
Y∼ν
[
E
X∼φY #µY
[1 {h(X) 6= Y }]
]
. (2)
Where for any 2 ∈ (0, 1), FX|2 is the set of functions that
imperceptibly modifies a distribution:
FX|2 :=
{
ψ ∈ FX | essup
x∈X
‖ψ(x)− x‖2 ≤ 2
}
.
Adversarial defense, a two-player zero-sum game. With
the setting defined above, the adversarial examples problem
can be seen as a two-player zero-sum game, where the
Defender tries to find the best possible hypothesis h, while
a strong Adversary is manipulating the dataset distribution:
inf
h∈H
sup
φ∈(FX|2)
2
Radv(h,φ). (3)
This means that the Defender tries to design the classifier
with the best performance under attack, whereas the Adver-
sary will each time design the optimal attack on this specific
classifier. In the game theoretical terminology, the choice of
a classifier h (resp. an attack φ) for the Defender (resp. the
Adversary) is called a strategy. It is crucial to note that the
sup-inf and inf-sup problems do not necessarily coincide.
In this paper, we mainly focus on the Defender’s point of
view which corresponds to the inf-sup problem. We will be
interested in understanding the behaviour of players in this
game, i.e. the best responses they have to a given strategy,
and whether some equilibria may arise. This motivates the
following definitions.
Definition 1 (Best Response). Let h ∈ H, and φ ∈(FX|2)2. A best response from the Defender to φ is a clas-
sifier h∗ ∈ H such that Radv(h∗,φ) = min
h∈H
Radv(h,φ).
Similarly, a best response from the Adversary to h is
an attack φ∗ ∈ (FX|2)2 such that Radv(h,φ∗) =
max
φ∈(FX|2)
2
Radv(h,φ).
In the remaining, we denote BR(h) the set of all best re-
sponses of the Adversary to a classifier h. Similarly BR(φ)
denotes the set of best responses to an attack φ.
Definition 2 (Pure Nash Equilibrium). In the zero-sum
game (Eq. 3), a Pure Nash Equilibrium is a couple of strate-
gies (h,φ) ∈ H × (FX|2)2 such that{
h ∈ BR(φ), and,
φ ∈ BR(h).
When it exists, a Pure Nash Equilibrium is a state of the
game in which no player has any incentive to modify its
strategy. In our setting, this simultaneously means that no
attack could better fool the current classifier, and that the
classifier is optimal for the current attack.
Remark. All the definitions in this section assume a de-
terministic regime, i.e. that neither the Defender nor the
Adversary use randomization, hence the notion of Pure
Nash Equilibrium in the game theory terminology. The
randomized regime will be studied in Section 5.
3.2. Trivial solution and Regularized Adversary
Trivial Nash equilibrium. Our current definition of the
problem implies that the Adversary has perfect information
on the dataset distribution and the classifier. It also has
unlimited computational power and no constraint on the
attack except on the size of the perturbation. Going back to
the example of the autonomous car, this would mean that the
Adversary can modify every single image that the camera
may receive during any trip, which is highly unrealistic. The
Adversary has no downside to attacking, even when the
attack is unnecessary, e.g. if the attack cannot work or if the
point is already misclassified.
This type of behavior for the Adversary can lead to the
existence of a pathological (and trivial) Nash Equilibrium
as demonstrated in Figure 1 for the uni-dimensional set-
ting with Gaussian distributions. The unbounded Adversary
moves every point toward the decision boundary (each time
maximizing the perturbation budget), and the Defender can-
not do anything to mitigate the damage. In this case the
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decision boundary for the Optimal Bayes Classifier remains
unchanged, even though both curves have been moved to-
ward the center, hence a trivial equilibrium. In the remaining
of this work, we show that such an equilibrium does not
exist as soon as there is a small restraint on the Adversary’s
strength, i.e. as soon as it is not perfectly indifferent to
produce unnecessary perturbations.
Regularized Adversary. To mitigate the Adversary
strength, we introduce a penalization term:
inf
h∈H
sup
φ∈(FX|2)
2
[Radv(h,φ)− λΩ (φ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
RΩadv(h,φ)
. (4)
The penalty function Ω represents the limitations on the Ad-
versary’s budget, be it because of computational resources
or to avoid being detected. λ ∈ (0, 1) is some regularization
weight. In this paper, we study two types of penalties: the
mass penalty Ωmass, and the norm penalty Ωnorm.
From a computer-security point of view, the first limitation
that comes to mind is to limit the number of queries the
Adversary can send to the classifier. In our distributional
setting, this boils down to penalizing the mass of points that
the function φ moves. Hence we define the mass penalty as:
Ωmass(φ) := E
Y∼ν
[
E
X∼µY
[1 {X 6= φY (X)}]
]
. (5)
The mass penalty discourages the Adversary from attacking
too many points by penalizing the overall mass of trans-
ported points. The second limitation we consider penalizes
the expected norm under φ:
Ωnorm(φ) := E
Y∼ν
[
E
X∼µY
[‖X − φY (X)‖2]
]
. (6)
This regularization is very common in both the optimization
and adversarial example communities. In particular, it is
used by Carlini & Wagner (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) to com-
pute the eponymous attack1. In the following, we denote
BRΩmass (resp. BRΩnorm ) the best responses for the Adver-
sary w.r.t the mass (resp. norm) penalty. Section 4 shows
that whatever penalty the Adversary has, no Pure Nash Equi-
librium exists. We characterize the best responses for each
player, and show that they can never satisfy Definition 2.
4. Deterministic regime
Notations. Let h ∈ H, we denote Ph :=
{x ∈ X | h(x) = 1}, and Nh := {x ∈ X | h(x) = -1} re-
spectively the set of positive and negative outputs of h. We
also denote the set of attackable points from the positive
1Ωnorm is not limited to `2 norm. The results we present hold
as long as the norm used to compare X and φY (X) comes from a
scalar product on X .
outputs Ph(δ) := {x ∈ Ph | ∃z ∈ Nh and ‖z − x‖2 ≤ δ},
and Nh(δ) likewise.
Adversary’s best response. Let us first present the best
responses of the Adversary under respectively the mass
penalty and the norm penalty. Both best responses share a
fundamental behavior: the optimal attack will only change
points that are close enough to the decision boundary. This
means that, when the Adversary has no chance of making
the classifier change its decision about a given point, it will
not attack it. However, for the norm penalty all attacked
points are projected on the decision boundary, whereas with
the mass penalty the attack moves the points across the
border.
Lemma 1. Let h ∈ H and φ ∈ BRΩmass(h). Then the
following assertion holds:{
φ1(x) ∈ (Ph){ if x ∈ Ph(2)
φ1(x) = x otherwise.
Where (Ph){, the complement of Ph in X . φ-1 is character-
ized symmetrically.
Lemma 2. Let h ∈ H and φ ∈ BRΩnorm(h). Then the
following assertion holds:
φ1(x) =
{
pi(x) if x ∈ Ph(2)
x otherwise.
Where pi is the orthogonal projection on (Ph){. φ-1 is char-
acterized symmetrically.
These best responses are illustrated in Figure 1 with two uni-
dimensional Gaussian distributions. For the mass penalty,
µ1 is set to 0 in Ph(2), and this mass is transported into
Nh(2). The symmetric holds for µ-1. After attack, we now
have µ1 (Ph(2)) = 0, so a small value of µ-1 in Ph(2)
suffices to make it dominant, and that zone will now be
classified -1 by the Optimal Bayes Classifier. For the norm
penalty, the part of µ1 that was in Ph(2) is transported on
a Dirac distribution at the decision boundary. Similarly to
the mass penalty, the best response now predicts -1 for the
zone Ph(2).
Remark. In practice, it might be computationally hard to
generate the exact best response for the norm penalty, i.e.
the projection on the decision boundary. That will happen
for example if this boundary is very complex (e.g. highly
non-smooth), or when X is in a high dimensional space.
To keep the attack tractable, the Adversary will have to
compute an approximated best response by allowing the
projection to reach the point within a small ball around the
boundary. This means that the best responses of the norm
penalty and the mass penalty problems will often match.
Defender’s best response. At a first glance, one would
suspect that the best response for the Defender ought to be
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Figure 1. Representation of the µ-1 (blue dotted line) and µ1 (red plain line) distributions, without attack (left) and with three different
attacks: no penalty (second drawing), with mass penalty (third) and with norm penalty (fourth). On all figures blue area on the left of the
axis is Ph(2) and red area on the right is Nh(2).
the Optimal Bayes Classifier for the transported distribution.
However, it is only well defined if the conditional distribu-
tions admit a probability density function. This might not
always hold here for the transported distribution. Neverthe-
less, we show that there is a property, shared by the Optimal
Bayes Classifier when defined, that always holds for the
Defender’s best response.
Lemma 3. Let us consider φ ∈ (FX|2)2. If we take h ∈
BR(φ), then for y = 1 (resp. y = -1), and for any B ⊂ Ph
(resp. B ⊂ Nh) one has
P(Y = y|X ∈ B) ≥ P(Y = −y|X ∈ B)
with Y ∼ ν and for all y ∈ Y , X|(Y = y) ∼ φy#µy .
In particular, when φ1#µ1 and φ-1#µ-1 admit proba-
bility density functions, Lemma 3 simply means that
h is the Optimal Bayes Classifier for the distribution
(ν, φ1#µ1, φ-1#µ-1)
2. We can now state our main theo-
rem, as well as two of its important consequences.
Theorem 1 (Non-existence of a pure Nash equilibrium).
In the zero-sum game (Eq. 4) with λ ∈ (0, 1) and penalty
Ω ∈ {Ωmass,Ωnorm}, there is no Pure Nash Equilibrium.
Consequence 1. (No free lunch for transferable attacks)
To understand this statement, remark that, thanks to weak
duality, the following inequality always holds:
sup
φ∈(FX|2)
2
inf
h∈H
RΩadv(h,φ) ≤ inf
h∈H
sup
φ∈(FX|2)
2
RΩadv(h,φ).
On the left side problem (sup-inf), the Adversary looks for
the best strategy φ against any unknown classifier. This
is tightly related to the notion of transferable attacks (see
e.g. (Tramèr et al., 2017)), which refers to attacks success-
ful against a wide range of classifiers. On the right side
(our) problem (inf-sup), the Defender tries to find the best
classifier under any possible attack, whereas the Adversary
plays in second and specifically attacks this classifier. As a
consequence of Theorem 1, the inequality is always strict:
sup
φ∈(FX|2)
2
inf
h∈H
RΩadv(h,φ) < inf
h∈H
sup
φ∈(FX|2)
2
RΩadv(h,φ).
2We prove this result in the supplementary material.
This means that both problems are not equivalent. In par-
ticular, an attack designed to succeed against any classifier
(i.e. a transferable attack) will not be as good as an attack
tailored for a given classifier. Hence she has to trade-off
between effectiveness and transferability of the attack.
Consequence 2. (No deterministic defense may be proof
against every attack) Let us consider the state-of-the-art
defense which is Adversarial Training (Goodfellow et al.,
2015; Madry et al., 2018). The idea is to compute an effi-
cient attack φ, and train the classifier on created adversarial
examples, in order to move the decision boundary and make
the classifier more robust to new perturbations by φ.
To be fully efficient, this method requires that φ remains
an optimal attack on h even after training. Our theorem
shows that it is never the case: after training our classifier
h to become (h′) robust against φ, there will always be a
different optimal attack φ′ that is efficient against h′. Hence
Adversarial Training will never achieve a perfect defense.
5. Randomization matters
As we showed that there is no Pure Nash Equilibrium, no
deterministic classifier may be proof against every attack.
We would therefore need to allow for a wider class of strate-
gies. A natural extension of the game would thus be to allow
randomization for both players, who would now choose a
distribution over pure strategies, leading to this game:
inf
η∈P(H)
sup
ϕ∈P
(
(FX|2)
2
) Eh∼η
φ∼ϕ
[RΩadv(h,φ)] . (7)
Without making further assumptions on this game (e.g. com-
pactness), we cannot apply known results from game theory
(e.g. Sion theorem) to prove the existence of an equilibrium.
These assumptions would however make the problem loose
much generality, and does not hold here.
Randomization matters. Even without knowing if an equi-
librium exists in the randomized setting, we can prove that
randomization matters. More precisely we show that, under
mild condition on the data distribution, any deterministic
classifier can be outperformed by a randomized one in terms
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Figure 2. Illustration of adversarial examples (only on class 1 for more readability) crossing the decision boundary (left), adversarially
trained classifier for the class 1 (middle), and a randomized classifier that defends class 1. Stars are natural examples for class 1, and
crosses are natural examples for class -1. The straight line is the optimal Bayes classifier, and dashed lines delimit the points close enough
to the boundary to be attacked resp. for class 1 and -1. We focus the drawing on the star points. Crosses can be treated symmetrically.
of the worst case adversarial risk. To do so we simplify
Equation 7 in two ways: 1. We do not consider the Adver-
sary to be randomized, i.e. we restrict the search space of the
Adversary to (FX )2 instead of P
(
(FX )2
)
. This condition
corresponds to the current state-of-the-art in the domain: to
the best of our knowledge, no efficient randomized adver-
sarial example attack has been designed (and so is used) yet.
2. We only consider a subclass of randomized classifiers,
called mixtures, which are discrete probability measures on
a finite set of classifier. We show that this kind of random-
ization is enough to strictly outperform any deterministic
classifier. We will discuss later the use of more general
randomization (such as noise injection) for the Defender.
Let us now define a mixture of classifiers.
Definition 3 (Mixture of classifier). Let n ∈ N, h =
(h1, ..., hn) ∈ Hn , and q ∈ P ({1, ..., n}). A mixed classi-
fier of h by q is a mapping mqh from X to P (Y) such that
for all x ∈ X , mqh(x) is the discrete probability distribution
that is defined for all y ∈ Y as follows:
mqh(x)(y) := Ei∼q [1 {hi(x) = y}] .
We call such a mixture a mixed strategy of the Defender.
Given some x ∈ X , this amounts to picking a classifier hi
from h at random following the distribution q, and use it to
output the predicted class for x, i.e. hi(x). Note that a mixed
strategy for the Defender is a non deterministic algorithm,
since it depends on the sampling one makes on q. Hence,
even if the attacks are defined in the same way as before, the
Adversary now needs to maximize a new objective function
which is the expectation of the adversarial risk under the
distribution mqh. It writes as follows:
E
Y∼ν
[
E
X∼φY #µY
[
E
Yˆ∼mqh(X)
[
1
{
Yˆ 6= Y
}]]]
− λΩ (φ) .
(8)
We also write RΩadv to mean the left part of Equation (8),
when it is clear from context that the Defender uses a mixed
classifier. Using this new set of strategies for the Defender,
we can study whether mixed classifiers outperform deter-
ministic ones, and how to efficiently design them.
Mixed strategy. We demonstrate that the efficiency of any
deterministic defense can be improved using a simple mixed
strategy. This method presents similarities with the notions
of fictitious play (Brown, 1951) in game theory, and boost-
ing in machine learning (Freund & Schapire, 1995). Given
a deterministic classifier h1, we combine it (via randomiza-
tion) with the best response h2 to its optimal attack.
The rational behind this idea is that, by construction, effi-
cient attacks on one of these two classifiers will not work on
the other. Mixing h1 with h2 has two opposite consequences
on the adversarial risk. On one hand, where we only had
to defend against attack on h1, we are now also vulnerable
to attacks on h2, so the total set of possible attacks is now
bigger. On the other hand, each attack will only work part of
the time, depending on the probability distribution q. If we
can calibrate the weights so that attacks on important zones
have a low probability of succeeding, then the average risk
under attack on the mixture will be low. This leads to the
following condition on the data distribution.
Definition 4 (-dilation and vanishing measure). Let U ⊂
X ,  > 0, and µ a probability measure.
1. The -dilation of U is as follows: U ⊕  :=
{u+ v | (u, v) ∈ U ×X and ‖v‖2 ≤ } .
2. We say that µ is -vanishing on U if we have:
µ (U ⊕ \U) ≤ µ(U).
On the vanishing measure condition. To better under-
stand this property, let us briefly introduce the following
toy example. In Figure 2 we present a simple setting of
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binary classification between two set of points. Attacking
the Optimal Bayes Classifier (bold straight line) consist in
moving all the points that lie between the dotted lines to the
opposite side of the decision boundary (Figure 2, left). The
general tactic to defend against an attack is to change the
classifier output when points are close to the boundary. This
can be done all the time, as in Adversarial Training (where
we move the decision boundary to incorporate adversarial
examples), or part of the time as in a randomized algorithm
(so that the attack only works with a given probability).
When we use Adversarial Training for the star points (Fig-
ure 2, middle), we change the output on the blue zone, so
that four of the star (squared) points cannot be successfully
attacked anymore. But in exchange, the dilation of the new
boundary can now be attacked. For Adversarial Training to
work, we need the number of new potential attacks (i.e. the
points that are circled, 2 crosses in the dilatation and 2 stars
that are close to the new boundary) to be smaller than the
number of attacks we prevent (the squared points, 4 blue
ones that an attack would send in the blue zone, and 3 red
points that are far from the new decision boundary). Here
we prevent 7 attacks at the cost of four new ones, so the
Adversarial Training improves the total score from 10 to
7. As we just saw, Adversarial Training only works if we
do not create more adversarial example than we prevent by
moving the decision boundary.
Similarly, we observe what happens for the randomized de-
fense (Figure 2, right). We mix the Optimal Bayes Classifier
with the best response to attacking all the points. We get
a classifier that is determinsitic outside the gray area, and
random inside it3. If the first classifier has a weight α = 0.5,
the 10 old attacks now succeed only with probability 0.5
(the new optimal attack for stars being to leave them in
place), whereas 3 new attacks are created (stars outside of
the gray area) that succeed with probability 0.5. The total at-
tack score is of 6.5, which is lower than the old attack score
of 10. Once again, the defense only works because there are
lesser points that are far from the decision boundary than
the the one that are close.
This toy examples highlights the fact that when no measure
have any vanishing zone, neither randomized defense, nor
Adversarial Training cannot bring any gain. Hence, the
role of Definition 4 is to check that there is at least one
defense that could help improving the classifier robustness.
Then, Theorem 2 shows that whenever a deterministic clas-
sifier can be improved (e.g. by Adversarial Training), it
will be outperformed under optimal attack by a random-
ized algorithm. We now can state our second main result:
3The grey area should actually be bigger since the best response
to the attack would also change the decision on the upper part
between the OBC and the doted line. We focus on what happens
on the star points for simplicity.
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Theorem 2. (Randomization matters) Let us consider
h1 ∈ H, λ ∈ (0, 1), Ω = Ωnorm, φ ∈ BRΩ(h1) and
h2 ∈ BR(φ). If µ1 (resp. µ-1) is 2-vanishing on Ph1(2)
(resp. on Nh1(2)), then for any α ∈ ( 1+λ22 , 1) and for any
φ′ ∈ BRΩ(mqh) one has
RΩadv(mqh,φ′) < RΩadv(h1,φ).
Where h = (h1, h2), q = (α, 1−α), and mqh is the mixture
of h by q. A similar result holds when Ω = Ωmass , with
α ∈ ( 1+λ2 , 1).
Based on Theorem 2 we devise a new procedure called
Boosted Adversarial Training (BAT) to construct a robust
mixture of two classifiers. It is based on three core princi-
ples: Adversarial Training, Boosting and Randomization.
6. Experiments: How to build the mixture
Simple mixture procedure (BAT). Given a dataset D and
a weight parameter α ∈ [0, 1], we construct h1 the first
classifier of the mixture using Adversarial Training4 on D.
Then, we train the second classifier h2 on a data set D˜
that contains adversarial examples against h1 created from
examples ofD. At the end we return the mixture constructed
with those two classifiers where the first one has a weight of
1−α and the second one a weight of α. The parameter α is
found by conducting a grid-search. In Table 1 we present
results for α = 0.2 under strong state-of-the-art attacks.
The procedure is summarized in Algorithm 25
Algorithm 1 Boosted Adversarial Training
Input : D the training data set and α the weight parameter.
Create and adversarially train h1 on D
Generate the adversarial data set D˜ against h1.
Create and naturally train h2 on D˜
q← (1− α, α)
h← (h1, h2)
return mqh
Comparison to fictitious play. Contrary to classical algo-
rithms such as Fictitious play that also generates mixtures of
classifiers, and whose theoretical guarantees rely on the exis-
tence of a Mixed Nash Equilibrium, the performance of our
method is ensured by Theorem 2 to be at least as good as the
classifier it uses as a basis. Moreover, the implementation
of Fictitious Play would be impractical on high dimensional
dataset we consider, due to computational costs.
4We use `∞-PGD with 20 iterations and ∞ = 0.031 to train
the first classifier and to build D˜.
5More algorithmic and implementation details can be found in
the supplementary materials.
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Dataset Method Natural Adaptive-l∞-PGD Adaptive-`2-C&WAccuracy ∞ = 0.031 2 = 0.4 2 = 0.6 2 = 0.8
CIFAR10
Natural 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AT (Madry et al., 2018) 0.83 0.42 0.60 0.47 0.35
Ours 0.80 0.55 0.60 0.57 0.53
CIFAR100
Natural 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AT (Madry et al., 2018) 0.58 0.26 0.38 0.29 0.22
Ours 0.56 0.40 0.45 0.41 0.38
Table 1. Evaluation on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 without data augmentation. Accuracy under attack of a single adversarially trained
classifier (AT) and the mixture formed with our method (Ours). The evaluation is made with Adaptive-`∞-PGD and Adaptive-`2-C&W
attacks both computed with 100 iterations. For Adaptive-`∞-PGD we use an epsilon equal to 8/255 (≈ 0.031), a step size equal to
2/255 (≈ 0.008) and we allow random initialization. For Adaptive-`2-C&W we use a learning rate equal to 0.01, 9 binary search steps,
the initial constant to 0.001, we allow the abortion when it has already converged and we give the results for the different values of
rejection threshold 2 ∈ {0.4, 0.6, 0.8}. As for EOT, we don’t need to estimate the expected accuracy of the mixture through Monte
Carlo sampling since we have the exact weight of each classifier of the mixture. Thus we give the exact expected accuracy.
Evaluating against strong adversarial attacks. When
evaluating a defense against adversarial examples, it is cru-
cial to test the robustness of the method against the best
possible attack. Accordingly, the defense method should
be evaluated against attacks that were specifically tailored
to it (a.k.a. adaptive attacks). In particular, when evalu-
ating randomized algorithms, one should use Expectation
over Transformation (EOT) to avoid gradient masking as
pointed out by (Athalye et al., 2018) and (Carlini et al.,
2019). More recently, (Tramer et al., 2020) emphasized that
one should also make sure that EOT is computed properly6.
Previous works such as (Dhillon et al., 2018) and (Pinot
et al., 2019) estimate the EOT through a Monte Carlo sam-
pling which can introduce a bias in the attack if the sample
size is to small. Since we assume perfect information for
the Adversary, it knows the exact distribution of the mix-
ture. Hence it can directly compute the expectation without
using a sampling method, which avoid any bias. Table 1
evaluate our method against strong adaptive attacks namely
Adaptive-`∞-PGD and Adaptive-`2-C&W.
Hard constraint parameter. The typical value of  in the
hard constraint depends on the norm we consider in the
problem setting. In this paper, we use an `2 norm, however,
the constraint parameter for `∞-PGD attack was initially
set to be an `∞ constraint. In order to compare attacks of
similar strength, we choose different threshold (2 or ∞)
values which result in balls of equivalent volumes. For
CIFAR10 an CIFAR100 datasets (Krizhevsky & Hinton,
2009), which are 3 × 32 × 32 dimensional spaces, this
gives ∞ = 0.03 and 2 = 0.8 (we also give results for 2
equal to 0.6 and 0.4 as this values are sometimes used in
the literature). Since Adaptive-`2-C&W attack creates an
6In order for the attack to succeed, it it more efficient to com-
pute the expected transformation of the logits instead of taking the
expectation over the loss. More details on this in the supplementary
materials.
unbounded perturbation on the examples, we implemented
the constraint from Equation 6 by checking at test time
whether the `2-norm of the perturbation exceeds a certain
threshold 2 ∈ {0.4, 0.6, 0.8}. If it does, the adversarial
example is disregarded, and we keep the natural example
instead.
Experimental results. In Table 1 we compare the accuracy,
on the CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, of our method and classical
Adversarial Training under attack with Adaptive-`∞-PGD
and Adaptive-`2-C&W, both run for 100 iterations. We
used 5 times more iteration for the evaluation as we used
during training, and carefully check for convergence. the
rational behind this is that, for a classifier to be fully robust,
its loss of accuracy should be controlled when the attacks
are stronger than the ones it was trained on. For both attacks,
both datasets and all thresholds (i.e. the budget for a pertur-
bation), the accuracy under attack of our mixture is higher
than the single classifier with Adversarial Training. Our
defense is especially more robust than Adversarial Training
when the threshold is high.
Extension to more than two classifiers. In this paper we
focus our experiments on a mixture of two classifiers to
present a proof of concept of Theorem 2. Nevertheless, a
mixture of more than two classifiers can be constructed by
adding at each step t a new classifier trained naturally on
the dataset D˜ that contains adversarial examples against
the mixture at step t − 1. Since D˜ has to be constructed
from a mixture, one would have to use an adaptive attack
as Adaptive-`∞-PGD. We refer the reader to the supple-
mentary material for this extended version of the algorithm
and for all the implementation details related to our ex-
periments (architecture of models, optimization settings,
hyper-parameters, etc.).
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7. Discussion & Conclusion
Finally, is there a classifier that ensures optimal robustness
against all adversarial attacks? We gave a negative answer
to this question in the deterministic regime, but part of
the question remains open when considering randomized
algorithms. We demonstrated that randomized defenses are
more efficient than deterministic ones, and devised a simple
method to implement them.
Game theoretical point of view. There remains to study
whether an Equilibrium exists in the Randomized regime.
This question is appealing from a theoretical point of view,
and requires to investigate the space of randomized Adver-
saries P((FX )2). The characterization of this space is not
straightforward, and would require strong results in the the-
ory of optimal transport. A possible research direction is
to quotient the space (FX )2 so as to simplify the search in
P((FX )2) and the characterization of the Adversary’s best
responses. The study of this equilibrium is tightly related
to that of the value of the game, which would be interesting
for obtaining min-max bounds on the accuracy under attack,
as well as certificates of robustness for a set of classifiers.
Advocating for more provable defenses. Although the
experimental results show that our mixture of classifiers out-
performs Adversarial Training, our algorithm do not provide
guarrantees in terms of certified accuracy. As the literature
on adversarial attacks and defenses demonstrated, better
attacks always exist. This is why, more theoretical works
need to be done to prove the robustness of a mixture created
from this particular algorithm. More generally, our work
advocates for the study of mixtures as a provable defense
against adversarial attacks. One could, for example, build
upon the connection between mixtures and noise injection
to investigate a broader range of randomized strategies for
the Defender, and devise certificates accordingly.
Improving Boosted Adversarial Training. From an algo-
rithmic point of view, BAT can be improved in several ways.
For instance, the weights can be learned while choosing
the new classifier for the mixture. This could lead to an
improved accuracy under attack, but would lack some the-
oretical justifications that still need to be set up. Finally,
tighter connections with standard boosting algorithms could
be established to improve the analysis of BAT.
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Supplementary Material
1. Omitted proofs and Additional results
Notations. Let us suppose that (X ,‖.‖) is a normed vector space. B‖.‖(x, ) = {z ∈ X | ‖x− z‖ ≤ } is the closed ball
of center x and radius  for the norm ‖.‖. Note that H := {h : x 7→ sgn g(x) | g : X → R continuous}, with sgn the
function that outputs 1 if g(x) > 0, −1 if g(x) < 0, and 0 otherwise. Hence for any (x, y) ∼ D, and h ∈ H one has
1{h(x) 6= y} = 1{g(x)y ≤ 0}.
Introducing remarks. Let us first note that in the paper, the penalties are defined with an `2 norm. However, Lemma
1 and 2 hold as long as X is an Hilbert space with dot product <|> and associated norm ||.|| = √< . | . >. We first
demonstrate Lemma 2 with these general notations. Then we present the proof of Lemma 1 that follows the same schema.
Note that, for Lemma 1, we do not even need the norm to be Hilbertian, since the core argument rely on separation property
of the norm, i.e. on the property ‖x− y‖ = 0 ⇐⇒ x = y.
Lemma 2. Let h ∈ H and φ ∈ BRΩnorm(h). Then the following assertion holds:
φ1(x) =
{
pi(x) if x ∈ Ph(2)
x otherwise.
Where pi is the orthogonal projection on (Ph){. φ-1 is characterized symmetrically.
Proof. Let us first simplify the worst case adversarial risk for h. Recall that h = sgn(g) with g continuous. From the
definition of adversarial risk we have:
sup
φ∈(FX|2)
2
RΩnormadv (h,φ) (9)
= sup
φ∈(FX )2
∑
y=±1
νy E
X∼µy
[
1 {h (φy(X)) 6= y} − λ‖X − φy(X)‖ −∞1 {‖X − φy(X)‖ > 2}
]
(10)
= sup
φ∈(FX )2
∑
y=±1
νy E
X∼µy
[
1 {g (φy(X)) y ≤ 0} − λ‖X − φy(X)‖ −∞1 {‖X − φy(X)‖ > 2}
]
(11)
=
∑
y=±1
νy sup
φy∈FX
E
X∼µy
[
1 {g (φy(X)) y ≤ 0} − λ‖X − φy(X)‖ −∞1 {‖X − φy(X)‖ > 2}
]
(12)
Finding φ1 and φ1 are two independent optimization problems, hence, we focus on characterizing φ1 (i.e. y = 1).
sup
φ1∈FX
E
X∼µ1
[
1 {g (φ1(X)) ≤ 0} − λ‖X − φ1(X)‖ −∞1 {‖X − φ1(X)‖ > 2}
]
(13)
= E
X∼µ1
[
essup
z∈B‖.‖(X,2)
1(g(z) ≤ 0)− λ‖X − z‖
]
(14)
=
∫
X
essup
z∈B‖.‖(x,2)
1 {g(z) ≤ 0} − λ‖x− z‖ dµ1(x). (15)
Let us now consider (Hj)j∈J a partition of X , we can write.
sup
φ1∈FX
E
X∼µ1
[
1 {g (φ1(X)) ≤ 0} − λ‖X − φ1(X)‖ −∞1 {‖X − φ1(X)‖ > 2}
]
(16)
=
∑
j∈J
∫
Hj
essup
z∈B‖.‖(x,2)
1 {g(z) ≤ 0} − λ‖x− z‖ dµ1(x) (17)
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In particular, we consider here H0 = P {h , H1 = Ph \ Ph(2), and H2 = Ph(2).
For x ∈ H0 = P {h . Taking z = x we get 1 {g(z) ≤ 0} − λ‖x− z‖ = 1. Since for any z ∈ X we have 1 {g(z) ≤ 0} −
λ‖x− z‖ ≤ 1, this strategy is optimal. Furthermore, for any other optimal strategy z′, we would have ‖x− z′‖ = 0, hence
z′ = x, and an optimal attack will never move the points of H0 = P {h .
For x ∈ H1 = Ph \ Ph(2). We have B‖.‖(x, 2) ⊂ Ph by definition of Ph(2). Hence, for any z ∈ B‖.‖(x, 2), one gets
g(z) > 0. Then 1 {g(z) ≤ 0} − λ‖x− z‖ ≤ 0. The only optimal z will thus be z = x, giving value 0.
Let us now consider x ∈ H2 = Ph(2) which is the interesting case where an attack is possible. We know that
B‖.‖(x, 2) ∩ P {h 6= ∅, and for any z in this intersection, 1(g(z) ≤ 0) = 1. Hence :
essup
z∈B‖.‖(x,2)
1 {g(z) ≤ 0} − λ‖x− z‖ = max(1− λ essinf
z∈B‖.‖(x,2)∩P{h
‖x− z‖, 0) (18)
= max(1− λpiB‖.‖(x,2)∩P{h (x), 0) (19)
Where piB‖.‖(x,2)∩P{h is the projection on the closure of B‖.‖(x, 2) ∩ P
{
h . Note that piB‖.‖(x,2)∩P{h exists: g is continuous,
so B‖.‖(x, 2) ∩ P {h is a closed set, bounded, and thus compact, since we are in finite dimension. The projection is however
not guaranteed to be unique since we have no evidence on the convexity of the set. Finally, let us remark that, since
λ ∈ (0, 1), and 2 ≤ 1, one has 1− λpiB‖.‖(x,2)∩P{h (x) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ H2. Hence, on Ph(2), the optimal attack projects
all the points on the decision boundary. For simplicity, and since there is no ambiguity, we write the projection pi.
Finally. Since H0 ∪H1 ∪H2 = X , Lemma 2 holds. Furthermore, the score for this optimal attack is:
sup
φ∈(FX|2)
2
RΩnormadv (h, φ) (20)
=
∑
y=±1
νy
∑
j∈J
∫
Hj
essup
z∈B‖.‖(x,2)
1 {g(z)y ≤ 0} − λ‖x− z‖ dµy(x) (21)
Since the value is 0 on Ph \ Ph(2) (resp. on Nh \Nh(2) ) for φ1 (resp. φ-1), one gets:
=ν1
 ∫
Ph(2)
(
1− λ‖x− pi(x)‖)dµ1(x) + ∫
P{h
1dµ1(x)
+ ν-1
 ∫
Nh(2)
(
1− λ‖x− pi(x)‖)dµ-1(x) + ∫
N{h
1dµ-1(x)

(22)
=ν1
 ∫
Ph(2)
(
1− λpi(x))dµ1(x) + µ1(P {h )
+ ν-1
 ∫
Nh(2)
(
1− λ‖x− pi(x)‖)dµ-1(x) + µ-1(N{h)
 (23)
=R(h) + ν1
∫
Ph(2)
(
1− λ‖x− pi(x)‖)dµ1(x) + ν-1 ∫
Nh(2)
(
1− λ‖x− pi(x)‖)dµ-1(x) (24)
(16) holds since R(h) = P(h(X) 6= Y )P(g(X)Y ≤ 0) = ν1µ1(P {h ) + ν-1µ-1(N{h). This provides an interesting
decomposition of the adversarial risk into the risk without attack and the loss on the attack zone.
Lemma 1. Let h ∈ H and φ ∈ BRΩmass(h). Then the following assertion holds:{
φ1(x) ∈ (Ph){ if x ∈ Ph(2)
φ1(x) = x otherwise.
Where (Ph){, the complement of Ph in X . φ-1 is characterized symmetrically.
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Proof. Following the same proof schema as before the adversarial risk writes as follows:
sup
φ∈(FX|2)
2
RΩmassadv (h, φ) (25)
= sup
φ∈(FX )2
∑
y=±1
νy E
X∼µy
[1 {h (φy(X)) 6= y} − λ1 {X 6= φy(X)} −∞1 {‖X − φy(X)‖ > 2}] (26)
= sup
φ∈(FX )2
∑
y=±1
νy E
X∼µy
[1 {g (φy(X)) y ≤ 0} − λ1 {X 6= φy(X)} −∞1 {‖X − φy(X)‖ > 2}] (27)
=
∑
y=±1
νy sup
φy∈FX
E
X∼µy
[1 {g (φy(X)) y ≤ 0} − λ1 {X 6= φy(X)} −∞1 {‖X − φy(X)‖ > 2}] (28)
Finding φ1 and φ1 are two independent optimization problem, hence we focus on characterizing φ1 (i.e. y = 1).
sup
φ1∈FX
E
X∼µ1
[
1 {g (φ1(X)) ≤ 0} − λ1 {X 6= φ1(X)} −∞1 {‖X − φ1(X)‖ > 2}
]
(29)
= E
X∼µ1
[
essup
z∈B‖.‖(X,2)
1 {g(z) ≤ 0} − λ1 {X 6= φ1(X)}
]
(30)
=
∫
X
essup
z∈B‖.‖(x,2)
1 {g(z) ≤ 0} − λ1 {x 6= φ1(x)} dµ1(x). (31)
Let us now consider (Hj)j∈J a partition of X , we can write.
sup
φ1∈FX
E
X∼µ1
[
1 {g (φ1(X)) ≤ 0} − λ1 {X 6= φ1(X)} −∞1 {‖X − φ1(X)‖ > 2}
]
(32)
=
∑
j∈J
∫
Hj
essup
z∈B‖.‖(x,2)
1 {g(z) ≤ 0} − λ1 {x 6= φ1(x)} dµ1(x) (33)
In particular, we can take H0 = P {h , H1 = Ph \ Ph(2), and H2 = Ph(2).
For x ∈ H0 = P {h or x ∈ H1 = Ph \ Ph(2). With the same reasoning as before, any optimal attack will choose
φ1(x) = x.
Let x ∈ H2 = Ph(2). We know thatB‖.‖(x, 2)∩P {h 6= ∅, and for any z in this intersection, one has g(z) ≤ 0 and z 6= x.
Hence essup
z∈B‖.‖(x,2)
1 {g(z) ≤ 0}− λ1 {z 6= x} = max(1− λ, 0). Since λ ∈ (0, 1) one has 1 {g(z) ≤ 0}− λ1 {z 6= x} =
1− λ for any z ∈ B‖.‖(x, 2) ∩ P {h . Then any function that given a x ∈ X outputs φ1(x) ∈ B‖.‖(x, 2) ∩ P {h is optimal on
H2.
Finally. Since H0 ∪H1 ∪H2 = X , Lemma 1 holds.
Lemma 3. Let us consider φ ∈ (FX|2)2. If we take h ∈ BR(φ), then for y = 1 (resp. y = -1), and for any B ⊂ Ph (resp.
B ⊂ Nh) one has
P(Y = y|X ∈ B) ≥ P(Y = −y|X ∈ B)
with Y ∼ ν and for all y ∈ Y , X|(Y = y) ∼ φy#µy .
Proof. We reason ad absurdum. Let us consider y = 1, the proof for y = −1 is symmetrical. Let us suppose that there
exists C ⊂ Ph such that ν-1φ-1#µ-1(C) > ν1φ1#µ1(C). We can then construct h1 as follows:
h1(x) =
{
h(x) if x /∈ C
−1 otherwise.
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Since h and h1 are identical outside C, the difference between the adversarial risks of h and h1 writes as follows:
RΩadv(h, φ)−RΩadv(h1, φ) (34)
=
∑
y=±1
νy
∫
C
(
1 {h(x) 6= y} − 1 {h1(x) 6= y}
)
d(φy#µy)(x) (35)
=ν−11 {h(x) = 1}φ−1#µ-1(C)− ν11 {h1(x) 6= 1}φ1#µ1(C) (36)
=ν−1φ−1#µ-1(C)− ν1φ1#µ1(C) (37)
Since by hypothesis ν−1φ−1#µ-1(C) > ν1φ1#µ1(C) the difference between the adversarial risks of h and h1 is strictly
positive. This means that h1 gives strictly better adversarial risk than the best response h. Since, by definition h is supposed
to be optimal, this leads to a contradiction. Hence Lemma 3 holds.
Additional Result. Let us assume that there is a probability measure ζ that dominates both φ1#µ1 and φ-1#µ-1. Let us
consider φ ∈ (FX|2)2. If we take h ∈ BR(φ), then h is the Bayes Optimal Classifier for the distribution characterized by
(ν, φ1#µ1, φ-1#µ-1).
Proof. For simplicity, we denote f1 =
(dφ1#µ1)
dζ and f−1 =
d(φ−1#µ-1)
dζ the Radon-Nikodym derivatives of φ1#µ1 and
φ−1#µ-1 w.r.t. ζ. The best response h minimizes adversarial risk under attack φ. This minimal risk writes:
inf
h∈H
RΩadv(h, φ) (38)
= inf
h∈H
∑
y=±1
νy E
x∼µy
[1 {h(φy(x)) 6= y}]− λΩ (φ) . (39)
Since the the penalty function does not depend on h, it suffices to seek inf
h∈H
∑
y=±1
νy
∫
X
1 {h(x) 6= y} d(φy#µy)(x).
Moreover thanks to the transfer theorem, one gets the following:
inf
h∈H
∑
y=±1
νy
∫
X
1 {h(x) 6= y} d(φy#µy)(x) (40)
= inf
h∈H
∑
y=±1
νy
∫
X
1 {h(x) 6= y} fy(x) dζ(x) (41)
= inf
h∈H
∫
X
∑
y=±1
νy1 {h(x) 6= y} fy(x) dζ(x). (42)
Finally, since the integral is bounded we get:
inf
h∈H
∫
X
∑
y=±1
νy1 {h(x) 6= y} fy(x) dζ(x) (43)
=
∫
X
[
inf
h∈H
∑
y=±1
νy1 {h(x) 6= y} fy(x)
]
dζ(x). (44)
Hence, the best response h is such that for every x ∈ X , and y ∈ Y , one has h(x) = y if and only if fy(x) ≤ f−y(x). Thus,
h is the optimal Bayes classifier for the distribution (ν, φ1#µ1, φ-1#µ-1). Furthermore, for y = 1 (resp. y = -1), and for
any B ⊂ Ph (resp. B ⊂ Nh) one has:
P(Y = y|X ∈ B) ≥ P(Y = −y|X ∈ B)
with Y ∼ ν and for all y ∈ Y , X|(Y = y) ∼ φy#µy .
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Theorem 1 (Non-existence of a pure Nash equilibrium). In our zero-sum game with λ ∈ (0, 1) and penalty Ω ∈
{Ωmass,Ωnorm}, there is no Pure Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. Let h be a classifier, φ ∈ BRΩ(h) an optimal attack against h. We will show that h /∈ BR(φ), i.e. that h
does not satisfy the condition from Lemma 3. This suffices for Theorem 1 to hold since it implies that there is no
(h,φ) ∈ H × (FX|2)2 such that h ∈ BR(φ) and φ ∈ BRΩ(h).
According to Lemmas 1 and 2, whatever penalty we use, there exists δ > 0 such that φ1#µ1 (Ph(δ)) = 0 or
φ−1#µ-1 (Nh(δ)) = 0. Both cases are symmetrical, so let us assume that Ph(δ) is of null measure for the transported
distribution conditioned by y = 1. Furthermore we have φ−1#µ-1 (Ph(δ)) = µ-1 (Ph(δ)) > 0 since φ−1 is the identity
function on Ph(δ), and since µ-1 is of full support on X . Hence we get the following:
φ−1#µ-1 (Ph(δ)) > φ1#µ1 (Ph(δ)) . (45)
Since the right side of the inequality is null, we also get:
φ−1#µ-1 (Ph(δ)) ν-1 > φ1#µ1 (Ph(δ)) ν1. (46)
This inequality is incompatible with the characterization of best response for the Defender of Lemma 3. Hence h /∈ BR(φ).
Theorem 2. (Randomization matters) Let us consider h1 ∈ H, λ ∈ (0, 1), Ω = Ωnorm, φ ∈ BRΩ(h1) and h2 ∈ BR(φ). If
µ1 (resp. µ-1) is 2-vanishing on Ph1(2) (resp. on Nh1(2)), then for any α ∈ ( 1+λ22 , 1) and for any φ′ ∈ BRΩ(mqh) one
has
RΩadv(mqh,φ′) < RΩadv(h1,φ).
Where h = (h1, h2), q = (α, 1 − α), and mqh is the mixture of h by q. A similar result holds when Ω = Ωmass , with
α ∈ ( 1+λ2 , 1).
Proof. Here we consider Ωnorm but the proof is similar for Ωmass. To demonstrate Theorem 2, we actually show a more
general result, where we only need µ1 to be 2-vanishing on some U ⊂ Ph1(2). In particular this will be true when
U = Ph1(2). Let us assume that such an U exists. We can construct h2 as follows:
h2(x) =
{ −h1(x) if x ∈ U
h1(x) otherwise.
This means that h2 changes the class of all points in U , and do not change the rest, compared to h1. Let α ∈ (0, 1), and the
corresponding mqh, and φ
′ ∈ BRΩnorm(mqh). We will find a condition on α so that the score of mqh is lower than the score of
h1.
RΩnormadv (mqh,φ′) =
∑
y=±1
νy
∫
X
essup
z∈B‖.‖(x,)
α1 {h1(z) 6= y}+ (1− α)1 {h2(z) 6= y} − λ||x− z|| dµy(x) (47)
The only terms that may vary between the score of h1 and the score of m
q
h are the integrals on U , U ⊕ 2 and φ−1−1(U)
(inverse image of U by φ−1), respectively the points we mix on, the points that may become attackable when y = 1 by
moving them on U , and the ones that were attacked for y = −1 by moving them on U . Hence, for simplicity, we only
write those terms in the following. Let us first consider the score of h1 under optimal attack. Thanks to the analysis of the
Lemma 2, it writes:
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sup
φ∈(FX|2)
2
RΩnormadv (h1,φ) (48)
=ν1
∫
U
(
1− λ‖x− piP{h1 (x)‖
)
dµ1(x) + ν−1µ-1(U) (49)
+ν−1µ-1 (U ⊕ 2 \ Ph1(2)) + ν1
∫
(U⊕2\U)\Ph1 (2)
0 dµ1(x) (50)
+ν−1µ-1 (U ⊕ 2 ∩ Ph1(2)) + ν1
∫
(U⊕2\U)∩Ph1 (2)
(
1− λ‖x− piP{h1 (x)‖
)
dµ1(x) (51)
+ν−1
∫
φ−1−1(U)
(
1− λ‖x− piU (x)‖
)
dµ-1(x). (52)
For y = 1 all points in Ph1(2) are attacked by projecting on the decision boundary, and no point outside is attacked. For
y = −1 some points of Nh1(2), that are attacked, may be sent into U , and others may not. Now let us consider the score of
the mixture under its optimal attack.
sup
φ∈(FX|2)
2
RΩnormadv (mqh,φ) (53)
=ν1
∫
U
max
(
1− α, α− λ‖x− piP{h1 (x)‖
)
dµ1(x) (54)
+ν−1
∫
U
max
(
α, 1− α− λ‖x− piU⊕2\U (x)‖
)
dµ-1(x) (55)
+ν1
∫
(U⊕2\U)∩Ph1 (2)
max
(
1− α− λ‖x− piU (x)‖, 1− λ‖x− piP{h1 (x)‖
)
dµ1(x) (56)
+ν−1µ-1 ((U ⊕ 2 \ U) ∩ Ph1 (2)) + ν1
∫
(U⊕2\U)\Ph1 (2)
max (0, 1− α− λ‖x− piU (x)‖) dµ1(x) (57)
+ν−1µ-1 ((U ⊕ 2 \ U) \ Ph1(2)) + ν−1
∫
φ−1−1(U)
max
(
0, 1− λ‖x− piN{h1 (x)‖, α− λ‖x− piU (x)‖
)
dµ-1(x) (58)
We need to take into account the special case of the points in the dilation that were already in the attacked zone before, and
that can now be attacked in two ways, either by projecting on U (but that works with probability α, since the classification
on U is now randomized) or by projecting on P {h1 , which works with probability 1 but may use more distance and so pay
more penalty. For y = −1, attacks on U now work with probability α instead of 1, so the attacker may choose to attack on
other points instead, even if that takes more distance.
We can now compute the difference between both risks, and show that it is strictly positive:
Randomization matters
∆RΩnormadv︷ ︸︸ ︷
sup
φ∈(FX|2)
2
RΩnormadv (h1,φ)− sup
φ∈(FX|2)
2
RΩnormadv (mqh,φ) (59)
> ν1
∫
U
1− λ‖x− piP{h1 (x)‖ −max
(
1− α, α− λ‖x− piP{h1 (x)‖
)
dµ1(x) (60)
+ν−1µ-1(U)− ν−1
∫
U
max
(
α, 1− α− λ‖x− piU⊕2\U (x)‖
)
dµ-1(x) (61)
+ν1
∫
(U⊕2\U)∩Ph1 (2)
1− λ‖x− piP{h1 (x)‖ −max
(
1− α− λ‖x− piU (x)‖, 1− λ‖x− piP{h1 (x)‖
)
dµ1(x) (62)
+ν−1
∫
φ−1−1(U)
1− λ‖x− piU (x)‖ −max
(
0, 1− λ‖x− piN{h1 (x)‖, α− λ‖x− piU (x)‖
)
dµ-1(x) (63)
− ν1
∫
(U⊕2\U)\Ph1 (2)
max (1− α− λ‖x− piU (x)‖, 0) dµ1(x) (64)
Let us simplify Equation (59) using using additional hypothesis:
• A sufficient condition for the adversarial risk to decrease will be to choose max
(
1− α, α− λ‖x− piP{h1 (x)‖
)
=
α − λ‖x − piP{h1 (x)‖, so that the attacker continues to attack on U even with a smaller probability of success, thus
reducing the adversarial risk. This gives us α >
1+λmax
x∈U
‖x−pi
P{
h1
‖
2 . In the remaining we consider such an α.
• In particular, this gives α > 1/2 and max (α, 1− α− λ‖x− piU⊕2\U (x)‖) = α. Hence line (61) = (1 −
α)ν−1µ-1(U) > 0.
• Furthermore, we have that 1− λ‖x− piP{h1 (x)‖ −max
(
1− α− λ‖x− piU (x)‖, 1− λ‖x− piP{h1 (x)‖
)
is equal to :{
0 if max = 1− λ‖x− piP{h1 (x)‖
1− λ‖x− piP{h1 (x)‖ − (1− α) + λ‖x− piU (x)‖ > −(1− α) elsewhere
Thus the expression on line (62) > −ν1(1− q)µ1 ((U ⊕ 2 \ U) ∩ Ph1 (2)).
• Also note that, max (1− α− λ‖x, piU (x)‖, 0) < 1− α. Hence line (64) > −ν1(1− α)µ1((U ⊕ 2 \ U) \ Ph1(2)).
Finally, (62) + (64) > −ν1(1− α)µ1((U ⊕ 2 \ U)), hence the difference between the adversarial risks is as follows:
∆RΩnormadv > ν1(1− α) (µ1(U)− µ1 ((U ⊕ 2) \ U)) (65)
Since µ1 is vanishing on U , the expected result holds for α >
1+λmax
x∈U
‖x−pi
P{
h1
‖
2 . Not that for any U ⊂ Ph (2), one have
max
x∈U
‖x− piP{h1 ≤ 2. Moreover, when U = Ph(2), we get maxx∈U ‖x− piP{h1 ‖ = 2, which gives the expected result.
2. Experimental results
In the experimental section, we consider X = [0, 1]3×32×32 to be the set of images, and Y = {1, ..., 10} or Y = {1, ..., 100}
according to the dataset at hand.
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2.1. Adversarial attacks
Let (x, y) ∼ D and h ∈ H. We consider the following attacks:
(i) `∞-PGD attack. In this scenario, the Adversary maximizes the loss objective function, under the constraint that the `∞
norm of the perturbation remains bounded by some value ∞. To do so, it recursively computes:
xt+1 = ΠB‖.‖(x,∞)
[
xt + β sgn
(∇xL (h (xt) , y))] (66)
where L is some differentiable loss (such as the cross-entropy), β is a gradient step size, and ΠS is the projection operator
on S. One can refer to (Madry et al., 2018) for implementation details.
(ii) `2-C&W attack. In this attack, the Adversary optimizes the following objective:
argmin
τ∈X
‖τ‖2 + λ× cost(x+ τ) (67)
where cost(x + τ) < 0 if and only if h(x + τ) 6= y. The authors use a change of variable τ = 12 (tanh(w) − x + 1) to
ensure that x+ τ ∈ X , a binary search to optimize the constant λ, and Adam or SGD to compute an approximated solution.
One should refer to (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) for implementation details.
2.2. Experimental setup
Datasets. To illustrate our theoretical results we did experiments on the CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 datasets.
See (Krizhevsky et al., 2009) for more details.
Classifiers. All the classifiers we use are WideResNets (see (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016)) with 28 layers, a widen
factor of 10, a dropout factor of 0.3 and LeakyRelu activations with a 0.1 slope.
Natural Training. To train an undefended classifier we use the following hyperparameters.
• Number of Epochs: 200
• Batch size: 128
• Loss function: Cross Entropy Loss
• Optimizer : SGD algorithm with momentum 0.9, weight decay of 2× 10−4 and a learning rate that decreases during
the training as follows:
lr =

0.1 if 0 ≤ epoch < 60
0.02 if 60 ≤ epoch < 120
0.004 if 120 ≤ epoch < 160
0.0008 if 160 ≤ epoch < 200
Adversarial Training. To adversarially train a classifier we use the same hyperparameters as above, and generate
adversarial examples using the `∞-PGD attack with 20 iterations. When considering that the input space is [0, 255]3×32×32,
on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, a perturbation is considered to be imperceptible for ∞ = 8. Here, we consider X =
[0, 1]3×32×32 which is the normalization of the pixel space [0.255]3×32×32. Hence, we choose 2 = 0.031 (≈ 8/255) for
each attack. Moreover, the step size we use for `∞-PGD is 0.008 (≈ 2/255), we use a random initialization for the gradient
descent and we repeat the procedure three times to take the best perturbation over all the iterations i.e the one that maximises
the loss. For the `∞-PGD attack against the mixture mqh, we use the same parameters as above, but compute the gradient
over the loss of the expected logits (as explained in the main paper).
Evaluation Under Attack. At evaluation time, we use 100 iterations instead of 20 for Adaptive-`∞-PGD, and the same
remaining hyperparameters as before. For the Adaptive-`2-C&W attack, we use 100 iterations, a learning rate equal to
0.01, 9 binary search steps, and an initial constant of 0.001. We give results for several different values of the rejection
threshold: 2 ∈ {0.4, 0.6, 0.8}.
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Computing Adaptive-`2-C&W on a mixture To attack a randomized model, it is advised in the literature (Tramer et al.,
2020) to compute the expected logits returned by this model. However this advice holds for randomized models that return
logits in the same range for a same example (e.g. classifier with noise injection). Our randomized model is a mixture
and returns logits that depend on selected classifier. Hence, for a same example, the logits can be very different. This
phenomenon made us notice that for some example in the dataset, computing the expected loss over the classifier (instead of
the expected logits) performs better to find a good perturbation (it can be seen as computing the expectation of the logits
normalized thanks to the loss). To ensure a fair evaluation of our model, in addition of using EOT with the expected logits,
we compute in parallel EOT with the expected loss and take the perturbation that maximizes the expected error of the
mixture. See the submitted code for more details.
Library used. We used the Pytorch and Advertorch libraries for all implementations.
Machine used. 6 Tesla V100-SXM2-32GB GPUs
2.3. Experimental details
Sanity checks for Adaptive attacks In (Tramer et al., 2020), the authors give a lot of sanity checks and good practices to
design an Adaptive attacks. We follow them and here are the information for Adaptive-`∞-PGD :
• We compute the gradient of the loss by doing the expected logits over the mixture.
• The attack is repeated 3 times with random start and we take the best perturbation over all the iterations.
• When adding a constant to the logits, it doesn’t change anything to the attack
• When doing 200 iterations instead of 100 iterations, it doesn’t change the performance of the attack
• When increasing the budget ∞, the accuracy goes to 0, which ensures that there is no gradient masking. Here are
some values to back this statement:
Epsilon 0.015 0.031 0.125 0.250
Accuracy 0.638 0.546 0.027 0.000
Table 2. Evolution of the accuracy under Adaptive-`∞-PGD attack depending on the budget ∞
• The loss doesn’t fluctuate at the end of the optimization process.
Selecting the first element of the mixture. Our algorithm creates classifiers in a boosting fashion, starting with an
adversarially trained classifier. There are several ways of selecting this first element of the mixture: use the classifier with
the best accuracy under attack (option 1, called bestAUA), or rather the one with the best natural accuracy (option 2). Table 3
compares both options.
Beside the fact that any of the two mixtures outperforms the first classifier, we see that the fisrt option always outperforms
the second. In fact, when taking option 1 (bestAUA = True) the accuracy under `∞-PGD attack of the mixture is 3% better
than with option 2 (bestAUA = False). One can also note that both mixtures have the same natural accuracy (0.80), which
makes the choice of option 1 natural.
Training method NA of the 1st clf AUA of the 1st clf NA of the mixture AUA of the mixture
BAT (bestAUA=True) 0.77 0.46 0.80 0.55
BAT (bestAUA=False) 0.83 0.42 0.80 0.52
Table 3. Comparison of the mixture that has as first classifier the best one in term of natural accuracy and the mixture that has as first
classifier the best one in term of Accuracy under attack. The accuracy under attack is computed with the `∞-PGD attack. NA means
matural accuracy, and AUA means accuracy under attack.
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2.4. Extension to more than two classifiers
As we mention in the main part of the paper, a mixture of more than two classifiers can be constructed by adding at each
step t a new classifier trained naturally on the dataset D˜ that contains adversarial examples against the mixture at step t− 1.
Since D˜ has to be constructed from a mixture, one would have to use an adaptive attack as Adaptive-`∞-PGD. Here is the
algorithm for the extented version :
Algorithm 2 Boosted Adversarial Training
Input : n the number of classifiers, D the training data set and α the weight update parameter.
Create and adversarially train h1 on D
h = (h1) ; q = (1)
for i = 2, . . . , n do
Generate the adversarial data set D˜ against mqh.
Create and naturally train hi on D˜
qk ← (1− α)qk ∀k ∈ [i− 1]
qi ← α
q← (q1, . . . , qi)
h← (h1, . . . , hi)
end
return mqh
Here to find the parameter α, the grid search is more costly. In fact in the two-classifier version we only need to train the
first and second classifier without taking care of α, and then test all the values of α using the same two classifier we trained.
For the extended version, the third classifier (and all the other ones added after) depends on the first classifier, the second
one and their weights 1− α and α. Hence the third classifier for a certain value of α can’t be use for another one and, to
conduct the grid search, one have to retrain all the classifiers from the third one. Naturally the parameters α depends on the
number of classifiers n in the mixtures.
